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Holland: Groce v. Foster: Expansion of Oklahoma's Public Policy Exception

NOTES AND COMMENTS
GROCE v. FOSTER: EXPANSION OF
OKLAHOMA'S PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION TO THE EMPLOYMENTAT-WILL DOCTRINE

I.

INTRODUCTION

An employment-at-will relationship was once defined as allowing
either the employer or the employee to terminate the relationship at
any time for any reason.' Gradually, however, exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine were created.2 The courts of several jurisdictions have held that an at-will employee may not be terminated if3
the termination is in violation of a clearly defined public policy.
Oklahoma is among the states which have adopted this public policy
exception to the at-will doctrine.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, recently
applied Oklahoma's public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine in Groce v. Foster.5 The issue presented was one of first impression in Oklahoma. 6 The Groce majority made a well-reasoned determination that the discharge of an employee in retaliation for his
refusal to abandon a lawsuit against a customer of the employer for an
on-the-job injury was a breach of public policy.7 The basis for the
1. Michelle Blake Johnson, Burk v. K-Mart Corporation:The Oklahoma Supreme Court
Adopts a Narrow Exception to the Employment-At-Will Rule?, 14 OKLA. Crry U. L. REv. 645,
645 (1989); Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Oklahoma's At-Will Rule: Heeding the Warnings of America's
Evolving Employment Law?, 39 OKLA. L. REv. 373, 373 (1986).
2. Johnson, supra note 1, at 646.
3. Tepker, supra note 1, at 373.
4. Johnson, supra note 1, at 650; Chris S. Quillin, Note, The Expansion of the PublicPolicy
Exception to the At-Will TerminationRule afterTate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 29 TULSA LJ. 207,
210 (1993).
5. 880 P.2d 902 (Okla. 1994).
6. Id. at 903.
7. Id. at 908.
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court's opinion, however, was not raised by the plaintiff.8 Instead, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court itself found an applicable public policy.9 In
doing so, the Groce court expanded Oklahoma's public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule.
II.
A.

GRocE v.

FOSTER

Facts

William Groce (Groce) was an employee-at-will of Midwestern
Services, Inc. (Midwestern), an oil field service company owned by
Bob Foster (Foster). 10 Groce was involved in an accident while working at a welsite."1 When the injury occurred, Groce was helping employees of Hydraulic Well Control, Inc. (Hydraulic).1 2 Hydraulic, a
13
service contractor at the job site, is also a customer of Midwestern.
As Groce was assisting in the lifting of a pipe, Hydraulic employees
dropped the pipe on his foot.14
Initially, Groce filed for workers' compensation from Midwestern
and obtained benefits.'" Groce then filed a third-party claim against
Hydraulic for his injuries.' 6 When Foster learned of Groce's action
against Hydraulic, Groce was told that his employment with Midwestern would be terminated unless he dismissed the suit against Hydraulic.17 Groce refused to comply with Foster's demand and was
subsequently fired.1 8 Following his termination, Groce filed an action
against Foster for wrongful discharge.' 9
The district court granted Foster's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim?3 The court of appeals affirmed the decision. 2 ' Groce
appealed, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma granted certiorari. 22
8. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.

9. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
10. Groce, 880 P.2d at 903.
11. Id.

12. Id.
13. Id. at 904.
14. Id. at 903.
15. Id.
16. Id. The court did not discuss whether Groce followed the procedures required by § 44 of

the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act, OKL.A. STAT. tit. 85, § 44 (1991), for bringing a
third-party action in addition to filing for workers' compensation. For cases which have construed the language of § 44 with regard to these procedures, see infra note 74.
17. Groce, 880 P.2d at 904.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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B. Issue Presented to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
May an employee-at-will sue his or her employer for wrongful
discharge when the employee is terminated for filing a claim against a
customer of the employer to recover compensation for job-related injuries caused by the customer?2 3
III. THE PuBLIc POLICY EXCEPTION IN OKLAHOMA

The Oklahoma Supreme Court expressly adopted a public policy
tort exception to the employment-at-will rule in Burk v. K-Mart
Corp.2 4 According to Burk, the termination of an employee-at-will

violates public policy if it "is contrary to a clear mandate of public
policy as articulated by constitutional, statutory or decisional law." s
In defining this public policy exception, the Burk court stressed that
the newly recognized exception is to be construed very narrowly.26
Hence, for the Burk exception to apply, an employee bringing a
wrongful termination action is required to support the claim with specific law - a constitutional provision, a statute, or case law.2 7 The
Burk public policy exception provides the basis for the decision in
Groce.2
IV. THE GROCE DEcIsION

In Groce, the Oklahoma Supreme Court vacated the opinion of
the court of appeals, reversed the dismissal order of the district court,
23. Id. at 903.
24. 770 P.2d 24, 28 (Okla. 1989).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 28-29. The Burk court used specific language to convey the intent of narrow
construction. First, the court stated that it "adopt[s] ...the public policy exception to the at-will
termination rule in a narrow class of ases... ." Id. at 28. Second, the court asserted that "the
public policy exception must be tightly circumscribed," concluding that "the circumstances which
present an actionable tort claim under Oklahoma law is where an employee is discharged for
refusing to act in violation of an established and well-defined public policy or for performing an
act consistent with a clear and compelling public policy." Id. at 29. Finally, the court declared
that it recognizes "a limited public policy exception to the terminable-at-will rule as an actionable tort claim in cases in which the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy." Id.
See also Smith v. Farmers Co-Op. Ass'n of Butler, 825 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Okla. 1992) (acknowledging the narrow scope of the Burk definition of the public policy exception). It is, however,
questionable how narrow the Burk exception really is when it permits reliance upon decisional
law.
27. Burk, 770 P.2d at 28. For cases applying Burk, see Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833
P.2d 1218 (Okla. 1992); Pearson v. Hope Lumber & Supply Co., 820 P.2d 443 (Okla. 1991);
Sargent v. Central Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 809 P.2d 1298 (Okla. 1991); Vannerson v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 784 P.2d 1053 (Okla. 1989); Todd v. Frank's Tong Serv., Inc.,
784 P.2d 47 (Okla. 1989).
28. 880 P.2d 902 (Okla. 1994).
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and remanded the case.2 9 In doing so, the court held that an employee-at-will may bring an action for wrongful discharge against an
employer who fires him or her for refusing to dismiss a suit against a
third party, who is a customer of the employer, for injuries received
while working.3
Groce argued that the Open-Court-of-Justice Clause of the
Oklahoma Constitution 31 provided him with a constitutional right to
seek compensation for his injuries against Hydraulic. 32 Thus, he asserted, any discharge from employment for exercising this right was a
violation of an Oklahoma public policy embodied in the Oklahoma
Constitution and, therefore, should not be permitted. 3
Conversely, Foster claimed Groce had not provided sufficient evidence to suggest that any public policy had been violated.3 4 In addition, Foster argued that the "open courts" provision was not
applicable to this case because the clause addresses the public administration of legal process rather than the rights of private individuals. 5
The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not adopt the view of either
party. Instead, the court based its decision on the public policy mandated by several sections of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation
Act. 6 First, the court found that Groce was forced to decide between
retaining his job at Midwestern and continuing his suit against Hydraulic.37 Because Groce's suit is legally protected under section 44 of
the Workers' Compensation Act, 38 his discharge violated public policy.3 9 Next, the court reasoned that since an employer may not dismiss an employee for seeking compensation for work-related injuries,
the employer is also prohibited from terminating an employee for
29. Id. at 908.
30. Id. at 905.
31. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6. This provision, entitled "Courts of justice open - Remedies
for wrongs - Sale, denial or delay," provides: "The courts of justice of the State shall be open to
every person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to
person, property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial,
delay, or prejudice." Id.
32. Groce, 880 P.2d at 905.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Id. Specifically, Foster characterized the "open courts" provision as follows: "the constitutional command for open access to the courts (a) is directed only to those who administer legal
process rather than to private individuals, (b) was framed to provide for equality in the administration of legal process, and (c) creates neither a new private right nor claim." Id.
36. OKLIA. STAT. tit. 85, §§ 1-95 (1991).
37. Groce, 880 P.2d at 905.
38. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 44 (1991).
39. Groce, 880 P.2d at 905-06.
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bringing a section 44 action against a third party for the same harm.4 0
Finally, the court determined Foster's action breached the public policy of the Workers' Compensation Act,41 specifically that policy which
dictates that the Workers' Compensation Court has exclusive jurisdiction "over all agreements reached between the injured employee and
either his/her employer or the responsible third party."'42
In addition, the court rejected the reasoning set forth in the dissenting opinion.43 The dissent focused on the "open courts" provision, the specific constitutional provision upon which the plaintiff
based his cause of action, arguing that the clause did not apply to this
situation." The majority refuted this argument by reiterating its reli45
ance on Oklahoma statutes rather than the Oklahoma Constitution,
thus reaching beyond the plaintiff's complaint to determine the appropriate public policy.
V.

ANALYSIS

The majority in Groce v. Foster"6 relied on the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act47 in reaching its decision.' The Act provides
a statutory basis for the public policy exception set forth in Burk v. KMart Corp.49 Specifically, sections 4450 and 551 of the Act provide

clear support for the exception. Likewise, the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act itself supplies a basis for applying the public
policy exception.52
40. Id. at 906.
41. The Groce court specifically relied on §§ 5-7,12,44-47 and 84 of the Workers' Compensation Act. Id.
42. Groce, 880 P.2d at 906.
43. Id. at 907-08.
44. Id. at 909-12 (Simms, J., dissenting). An additional argument raised by the dissent was
that the termination of Groce had not resulted in a denial of Groce's access to the courts. Id. at
909. The dissent relied on DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980). In
DeMarco, the employee claimed he was discharged for suing his employer over injuries his
daughter received in the employer's store. DeMarco, 384 So. 2d at 1253. The DeMarco court
noted, however, that because this suit was still pending after the employee was terminated, the
employee had not been denied access to the courts. Id. at 1254.
45. Groce, 880 P.2d at 907.
46. Id.
47. Oa.A. STAT. tit. 85, §§ 1-95 (1991).

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Groce, 880 P.2d at 907.
770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989).
OKLA.STAT. tit. 85, § 44 (1991).
OKLA.STAT. tit. 85, § 5 (1991).
See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, as the Groce dissent correctly determined, the
Open-Court-of-Justice Clause does not provide proper support for application of the public policy exception.5 3 Thus, the Groce majority
implicitly rejected use of the "open courts" provision, reasoning that
specific sections of the Workers' Compensation Act provided the necessary public policy to conclude the employee had been wrongfully
discharged. 54
A. Section 44 of the Workers' Compensation Act
The Groce majority relied most heavily on section 44 of the
Workers' Compensation Act.55 Section 44 applies to an employee entitled to workers' compensation under the Act but whose job-related
injury was caused by the negligence of a third party.5 6 In that situation, section 44 provides that the employee may elect to bring an action against the third party.57 Construing section 44 in previous cases,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized that employees have a
right to sue third parties who have contributed to their on-the-job injuries. 8 Some of these decisions indicate that this right is not a new
right created by the statute, but is a right which existed at the common
59
law.
In Parkhill Truck Co. v. Wilson,60 the court determined that the
Workers' Compensation Act6 ' did not have any effect on the right of
an injured employee to bring an action against a third party who
caused the employee's injury. 62 The Parkhill court indicated that the
legislative intent behind the Act provided support for this conclusion:
"It was never intended by the Legislature by the enactment of the
53. See Groce, 880 P.2d at 910-12 (Simms, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 907.
55. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 44 (1991).
56. Id.
57. Id. Section 44(a) provides, in relevant part:
If a worker entitled to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act is injured
or killed by the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ, such injured
worker shall, before any suit or claim under the Workers' Compensation Act, elect
whether to take compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act, or to pursue his
remedy against such other. Such election shall be evidenced in such manner as the
Administrator may by rule or regulation prescribe.
Id.
58. See infra notes 60-77 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
60. 125 P.2d 203 (Okla. 1942).
61. At the time of the Parkhilldecision, the Act was entitled the Workmen's Compensation
Act. Id. at 205. However, the language of § 44 is almost identical to the language of the current
§ 44. Compare OYL.A. STAT. tit. 85, § 44 (1991) with OI.A. STAT. tit. 85, § 44 (1931).
62. Parkhill,125 P.2d at 206.
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Workmen's Compensation Act to abrogate, modify, or in anyway [sic]
affect the common-law right to exact payment of a negligent third
party or tort-feasor."6 3 Furthermore, the Parkhill court stated that
section 44 does not "increase or decrease such third party's liability
under the common law for negligence."' In reaching this conclusion,
the Parkhill court affirmed the common law right of an employee to
sue a third party, a right that is codified in section 44.
The court in Horwitz Iron & Metal Co. v. Myler6 5 also concluded
that the right to sue a third party under section 44 is not a new right:
"Section 44 of the Act did not create a new right, for the common-law
right always existed."66 Relying on Parkhill,the Horwitz court determined that the common law liability of a third party for negligence in
injuring the employee of another has not been altered by section 44.67
Therefore, the Horwitz decision also affirmed the common law right
codified by section 44.
A final decision linking section 44 to the common law is Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Leedy.68 In Leedy, the court asserted that section 44 provides procedures an employee must follow to bring a common law
action against a third party.69 Furthermore, the Leedy court acknowledged that section 44 includes the common law right of an employee
to sue a third party for work-related injuries caused by the third
party. 7° Thus, Leedy recognized the right of employees to sue third
parties under the Workers' Compensation Act.
In addition to the cases linking the section 44 right to sue a third
party to the common law right, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has declared that section 44 provides an independent right of employees.7 1
In Ladd v. Hudson,7 2 the court relied on the language of the statute7 3
to assert that an injured employee may elect to sue a third party who
63. Id.
64. Id. at 208.
65. 252 P.2d 475 (Okla. 1952).
66. Id. at 480.
67. Id. at 481.
68. 450 P.2d 898 (Okla. 1969).
69. Id. at 900. The Leedy court relied on the Parkhill decision for the reasons for such
procedures. Id.
70. Id.
71. Ladd v. Hudson, 288 P. 331 (Okla. 1930).
72. Id.
73. The statute in the Ladd decision is the equivalent of the current § 44 of the Workers'
Compensation Act. Id. at 332.
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contributed to the employee's injury. 7 Additionally, the court expressly stated that a right exists according to the statute: "If the employee believes his cause of action is such that he might recover more
against the third person than he would be permitted to recover against
his employer under the Compensation Law, then he doubtless would
sue the third party. The law intended he should have that right. '75
Thus, the Ladd court interpreted the language of the statute as providing a right to employees to sue third parties.
An additional decision that discusses the right of an employee to
76
a
sue third party for work-related harm is German v. Chemray, Inc.
The German court reasoned that according to both section 44 and previous findings of the court, this right of the employee has to be protected: "A right of action against third persons is reserved to an
injured employee by statute and decided cases." 77 Therefore, section
44 does express a specific right of employees to sue third parties who
contribute to their work-related injuries.
Considering the decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
conjunction with the language of section 44 of the Workers' Compensation Act leads to the conclusion that section 44 does provide employees a right to sue third parties. Because this right is protected by
statute, it violates the public policy of the state when an employer
terminates an employee for exercising this right. Thus, the Groce
court properly determined that section 44 is a basis for the public policy exception established by the Burk decision.78

74. Id. Oklahoma courts have interpreted the meaning of the term "elect," but a discussion
of this is beyond the scope of this note. See Weiss v. Salvation Army, 556 P.2d 598, 600-01 (Okla.
1976) (An employee "injured by third party negligence, has a choice to pursue one of two procedures as a means of seeking relief.... Firstan injured workman may elect to seek workmen's
compensation.... Second, a workman injured by one not in the same employ may proceed
directly against the negligent third party."); Parkhill,125 P.2d at 209 ("If the injured employe
[sic] fails to comply with the Workmen's Compensation Act ... and pursues his remedy against
the third party without asserting his election and complying with the rules and regulations of the
Commission relative thereto he may waive his right thereafter to proceed against the employer."); Ladd, 288 P. at 333 ("The employee... is required by law to elect which remedy he
will pursue.").
75. Ladd, 288 P. at 332-33. See also State Highway Dep't v. Elledge, 209 P.2d 704, 709

(Okla. 1949) (holding employee "had a right to pursue his remedy against... the third party
causing his injuries").
76. 564 P.2d 636 (Okla. 1977).
77. Id. at 639.
78. Groce, 880 P.2d at 908.
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B. Section 5 of the Workers' Compensation Act
79
Interpretation of section 5 of the Workers' Compensation Act
further supports the Groce court's conclusion that the right of an employee to sue a third party for work-related injuries is protected by
statute. Section 5 provides that an employer may not terminate an
employee because the employee files a claim, hires an attorney to represent him or her regarding a claim, institutes a proceeding under the
Workers' Compensation Act, or testifies in a proceeding. 80 This language is applicable to the Groce decision because a section 44 suit
against a third party may be considered a proceeding within the meaning of section 5.81 Two recent Oklahoma decisions provide compelling
interpretations of section 5.
First, in Buckner v. General Motors Corp.,8 2 the court relied on
the legislative intent behind section 5 in interpreting the institution of
proceedings language: "[T]he legislature intended to frame a standard
to fit the circumstances of individual cases which involved retaliation
for any substantial exercise of a right under the Act." 83 Thus, the court
determined that a decision as to what actually constitutes the institution of a proceeding must be made in each individual case. 4 Because
Groce's third-party action constituted the exercise of a right under
section 44 of the Act, his third-party action qualified as a proceeding
protected by section 5 of the Act.
A second case, Mann v. City of Norman,'5 also provides an interpretation of section 5. The Mann court stated that "[w]rongful termination in violation of [section 5] is an action sounding in tort. '8 6 Thus,
according to Mann, an employee may bring a wrongful discharge suit
against his or her employer when the employer violates section 5.

79. Omaa. STAT. tit. 85, § 5 (1991).
80. Id. The specific language of § 5 provides, in relevant part:

No person, firm, partnership or corporation may discharge any employee because the
employee has in good faith filed a claim, or has retained a lawyer to represent him in

said claim, instituted or caused to be instituted, in good faith, any proceeding under the
provisions of 'litle 85 of the Oklahoma Statutes, or has testified or is about to testify in
any such proceeding.
Id.
81. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
82. 760 P.2d 803 (Okla. 1988).
83. Id. at 808.
84. Id. In addition, the Buckner court discussed what may constitute the institution of a
workers' compensation claim beyond the actual filing of a claim. Id. at 808-811.
85. 782 P.2d 152 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989).
86. Id. at 154.
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This suggests a public policy of prohibiting employers from terminating employees for attempting to receive compensation for work-related injuries. Because a section 44 suit is protected under section 5 as
a means of receiving compensation, section 5 creates a statutory basis
for the public policy exception to the at-will employment rule. Therefore, section 5 supports the Groce court's conclusion that the right of
an employee to sue a third party for work-related injuries is protected
by statute.
C. Purpose of the Workers' CompensationAct
The purpose behind the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act
provides additional support for the decision reached by the Groce
court. The complete title of the original Act 7 consists of the following language: "AN ACT providing for the compulsory compensation
of injured employees in hazardous industries, placing the supervision
of the act under a commission herein created. Fixing a schedule of
awards, and providing penalties for the violation of the act."88 This
title suggests that the Act was created to provide employees with a
system of redress for injuries received while working.8 9 Thus, it is public policy that employees should be protected when seeking compensation. In Groce, the court determined that the case qualified for the
public policy exception to the at-will employment rule.90 Groce,
therefore, should have an opportunity to seek compensation, whether
it be from his employer, the responsible third party, or both. This
decision is consistent with the public policy set forth in the Workers'
Compensation Act. In addition, because this public policy has been
codified, it falls under the guidelines established by the Burk court to
govern the use of the public policy exception. 91 Therefore, the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act provides support for the right
of Groce to sue the third party to receive compensation for his workrelated injuries.
87. The short title of this original act was "Workmens Compensation Law." 1915 Okla.
Sess. Laws 574. While the Act has been amended several times since it was initially enacted,
much of the Act remains the same today as it was originally.
88. Id.

89. See also Parkhill Track Co. v. Wilson, 125 P.2d 203,206 (Okla. 1942) ("The Workmen's
Compensation Act was enacted by the Legislature for the benefit of injured employees engaged
in the hazardous employments described therein.").

90. Groce, 880 P.2d at 905.
91. Burk, 770 P.2d at 28.
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The Open-Court-of-JusticeClause of the Oklahoma Constitution
The Oklahoma Constitution's Open-Court-of-Justice Clause 92
does not provide support for application of the public policy exception
to the employment-at-will rule. In Groce, the employee argued that
the "open courts" provision provided him with the right to sue a third
party for his work-related injuries. 93 Thus, the employee claimed his
employer had wrongfully terminated him when he refused to drop the
suit against the third party.94 Acceptance of the employee's argument
would provide a constitutional mandate of public policy, which would
satisfy the Burk requirement.
The Groce majority did not expressly reject the employee's "open
courts" argument. Instead, the Groce majority stated that its "analysis
reaches beyond the private-versus-public-remedy dichotomy and finds
its anchor in clearly declared public policy."'95 According to the Groce
dissent, the majority opinion did rely on the "open courts" provision
in reaching its decision. 96 Contrary to the view of the Groce dissent,
however, the Groce majority implicitly rejected use of the "open
courts" clause by relying on the statutory provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act.97 Had the Groce majority accepted the employee's "open courts" argument, there would have been no need for
reliance on the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.
The Groce dissent properly rejected the use of the "open courts"
provision as a basis for the public policy exception to the at-wil rule.98
The purpose of this clause of the Oklahoma Constitution is to prevent

D.

92. OKLA. CONsr. art. II, § 6.
93. Groce, 880 P.2d at 905.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 907.
dissenting).
96. Id. at 909 (Simms, J.,
97. Id. at 906.
98. This is consistent with the decisions of other courts. See Beam v. Ipco Corp., 838 F.2d
242, 247 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that the employee "presented no basis for his suggestion that
protecting access to the courts entails allowing any employee who faces termination to obtain
just cause protections simply by consulting a lawyer at the first sign of trouble."); Deiters v.
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1023, 1029 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (The Tennessee Constitution "open courts" provision "does not create a clear and unambiguous public policy exception
to the employment at will doctrine."); Whitman v. Schlumberger Ltd., 793 F. Supp. 228, 231
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (asserting that the California Constitution's "open courts" provision "is silent
on the question of whether Plaintiff has a right of access to the courts free from retaliation by
1983)
another."); Kavanaugh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F. Supp. 242, 244 (N.D. Ill.
("[A] party does not violate another party's right to counsel or to free access to the courts by
taking measures, even though retaliatory and spiteful in nature, which lawfully are available to
him simply because resort to these measures somehow penalizes the other party for suing.");
McCloskey v. Eagleton, 789 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (Because the employee did
not "advance a cause of action under a recognizable exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, this constitutional provision [Missouri "open courts" provision] is not implicated.").

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1994

11

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 30 [1994], Iss. 3, Art. 4

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:525

public officials from denying parties access to the judicial system. 99
Therefore, this clause does not apply to private individuals, such as
the employer in Groce, who prevent others from bringing or continuing a suit. Consequently, the "open courts" provision can not be used
as a basis for the public policy exception to the employment-at-will
rule.
VI.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROCE DECISION

The impact of the Groce decision on employees is positive. Em-

ployees will now be fully protected when they seek a remedy for
work-related injuries. Prior to Groce, an employee could receive
worker's compensation from his or her employer without being subject to termination by the employer. 10° Now, the employee is also
protected from termination for bringing an action against any third
party who contributes to the employee's injury, In addition, if the
lower courts follow the Groce decision closely, the employee will no
longer be required to point to the particular public policy which provides an exception to the employment-at-will rule. If some public policy exists, the court may find it for the employee as did the Groce
majority. Thus, the Groce decision represents a victory for employees.
99. For an interpretation of the Oklahoma Constitution "open courts" provision, see
Woody v. State, 833 P.2d 257, 260 (Okla. 1992) ("The clear language of art. 2, § 6 requires that
the courts must be open to all on the same terms without prejudice."); Moses v. Hoebel, 646 P.2d
601, 604 (Okla. 1982) ("Under the Open-Court-of-Justice Clause of the state constitution, the
obligation adjudicated against [plaintiff] cannot serve as a bar to his courthouse access for the
prosecution of another case."); Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 613 P.2d 1041, 1044-45 (Okla.
1980) ("The courts must be open to all on the same terms without prejudice."); Adams v. Iten
Biscuit Co., 162 P. 938, 942 (Okla. 1917) ("[S]ection 6, art. 2, was intended to preserve a right of
action in the courts of the state to persons for injuries that may happen in the future .... [T]his
was a mandate to the judiciary.").
For the construction of the "open courts" provision of other state constitutions, see
DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1980) (declaring that "there
is no civil cause of action for interference with the exercise of one's right under [the Florida
Constitution "open courts" provision]."); Simpson v. Kilcher, 749 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. 1988)
(asserting that the Missouri Constitution "open courts" provision "was not designed to create
rights, but only to allow a person claiming those rights access to the courts when such a person
has a legitimate claim recognized by the law."); McCloskey v. Eagleton, 789 S.W.2d 518, 520
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (The Missouri Constitution "open courts" provision "has been interpreted
many times as not being designed to create rights, but only allowing a person claiming rights
'access to the courts when such a person has a legitimate claim recognized by the law."'); Meech
v. Hillhaven, 776 P.2d 488, 493 (Mont. 1989) ("Clauses insuring equal administration of justice
are aimed at the judiciary ... [thus] our remedy guarantee [Montana Constitution "open courts"
provision] does not create a fundamental right to full legal redress.").
100. See Ingram v. Oneok, Inc., 775 P.2d 810, 815 (Okla. 1989) ("[T]he intent of the Legislature, embodied in 85 O.S. 1931 §§ 5-7, created a new and separate cause of 'action upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty."'); Mann v. City of Norman, 782 P.2d
152,154 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989) ("Wrongful termination in violation of 85 O.S. §§ 5-7 is an action
sounding in tort.").
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Although the decision in Groce was well-reasoned, application of
the Groce decision in future cases may present some problems for the
courts. One problem which may arise in the future involves an expansion of the public policy exception to the at-will rule as defined in
Burk v. K-Mart Corp.1 1 Courts will likely interpret the Groce opinion, as did the Groce dissent, 102 as an expansion of Oklahoma's public
policy exception. As recognized by the Groce dissent, "[t]he burden
was on the employee, Groce, to prove that he was discharged in contravention of a clear mandate of public policy."' 03 By basing its decision on a public policy not advanced in the plaintiff's petition, the
Groce majority has shown that it is not necessarily the responsibility
of the plaintiff to advance the appropriate public policy but that the
court may find the public policy itself. The intent of the Burk court
was to create an exception that was to be construed very narrowly."°
After the Groce decision, future courts may attempt to expand the
exception well beyond the narrow Burk rule. Further expansion of
the exception may create additional problems for employers and employees that can not be determined at this time.
Another future problem involves the Open-Court-of-Justice
Clause of the Oklahoma Constitution. 0 5 While the Groce court implicitly rejected use of the Open-Court-of-Justice Clause as a basis for
the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule, 10 6 some

courts might reach a different interpretation of the decision. Because
the "open courts" clause is not expressly repudiated by Groce, future
courts may determine that the clause is an acceptable support for a
public policy exception. In light of the decisions construing "open
courts" provisions, 0 7 this is not an accurate construction of the
Oklahoma clause. Such an interpretation would create a right to
bring an action that is not actually protected by the Oklahoma Constitution. The Groce dissent accurately explained the rationale for not
allowing the "open courts" provision to be used as a basis for the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule.' 08 Thus, if future
courts do not find that the Groce majority rejected the "open courts"
provision, they should adopt the reasoning of the Groce dissent and
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989).
dissenting).
Groce, 880 P.2d at 909-12 (Simms, J.,
Id. at 912.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
OM.A.CONsT. art. II, § 6.
Groce, 880 P.2d at 903-08.
See supra notes 98-99.
Groce, 880 P.2d at 909-13 (Simms, . dissenting).
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reject the "open courts" provision as a basis for the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In Groce v. Foster,10 9 the Oklahoma Supreme Court made a wellreasoned determination that the discharge of an employee in retaliation for refusing to abandon a lawsuit against a customer of the employer arising from an on-the-job injury is a breach of public policy.
Because the Groce majority relied on a public policy other than that
which the plaintiff advanced, the court expanded Oklahoma's public
policy exception to the employment-at-will rule. The Groce majority
relied on the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act as a basis for the
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine as defined
in Burk v. K-Mart Corp."0 Section 44 of the Act provides employees
with the right to bring an action against third parties who contribute
to their work-related injuries. In addition, section 5 of the Act and the
purpose behind the Act indicate that this right is protected by the
Workers' Compensation Act. Moreover, the Groce majority correctly
refused to recognize the Open-Court-of-Justice Clause of the
Oklahoma Constitution as a basis for the public policy exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine.
By determining the applicable public policy on its own, the Groce
court provided a positive outcome for employees. The victory for employees and loss for employers is that Oklahoma courts are given the
message that as long as some statute, constitutional provision, or case
law exists upon which a Burk public policy argument can be based, the
employee will have a cause of action against the employer. Not only
must employers be cautious not to terminate employees in violation of
commonly known public policies, such as age, race, and sex, now they
must familiarize themselves with all public policy to make certain that
they are not in violation.
Jennifer L. Holland

109. 880 P.2d 902 (Okla. 1994).
110. 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989).
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